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I. Introduction 
If one affirms an unrestricted law of bivalence, then there is a 
set of present truths that captures everything about the future. To 
begin, let me explain and briefly criticize (the affirmation of) this 
law. By 'unrestricted bivalence', I mean the common philosophical 
position that all propositions are either true or false (a.k.a. not 
true) including propositions about the future, and all the while 
ignoring the distinction between internal and external negation. 
By 'external negation', I mean the negation of an (entire) claim, 
and by 'internal negation', I mean a claim with a negative predicate. 
For example, // is not the case that I will score a 1600 the next 
time I take the SAT test is an external negation; whereas I will not 
score a 1600 the next time I take the SAT test is an internal negation. 
The difference between the two claims can be seen as follows: if 
it is presently undetermined whether or not I score a 1600 the next 
time I take the SAT test (i.e. my scoring 1600 is consistent with all 
present truths and my not scoring a 1600 is also consistent with all 
present truths), then / will score a 1600 the next time I take the 
SAT test is false but so is / will not score a 1600 the next time I 
take the SAT test. If it is genuinely undetermined whether or not I 
will score a 1600, the claim that I will achieve that score is false 
and so is the claim that I will not achieve that score. In other 
words, in the scenario just described // is not the case that I will 
score a 1600 the next time 1 take the SAT test is true but / will not 
score a 1600 the next time I take the SAT test is false. This shows 
that the former, the external negation, is not (logically) equivalent 
to the latter, the internal negation. As long as the distinction 
between internal and external negation is appreciated, one can 
affirm a sensible, restricted bivalence as involving external 
negations of claims and alongside it maintain the law of excluded 
middle (every proposition is either true or not true/false) and the 
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law of non-contradiction (no proposition is both true and not true/ 
false). In order to appreciate the distinction just highlighted, one 
ought to affirm bivalence only in this restricted sense. 
Now, since there are propositions that concern all possible 
future states of affairs, it follows from unrestricted bivalence that 
all (logically possible) future states of affairs either will obtain, or 
will not obtain. For example, right now, either it is true that I will 
fall asleep at 11:17 p.m. this evening or it is true that I will not fall 
asleep at 11:17 p.m. this evening. At this point, an interesting 
question arises: does this in turn mean that it is now either 
necessary or impossible that I fall asleep at 11:17 p.m. this evening? 
I think we often have mixed feelings here- or at least we did before 
we came to a firm philosophical position on the matter. On the 
one hand, it seems that if we take the claim that a proposition 
about the future is true seriously, not confusing it with the claim 
that the proposition is likely true or the claim that some wise 
individual (or individuals) think it is true, then there is simply no 
other way the world (this world) can go. What is true cannot 
become false; hence what is true is logically fixed, or necessarily 
true. On the other hand, we suspect that in the reasoning just 
mentioned we are somehow confusing truth with necessity (and 
falsity with impossibility); that a proposition is true does not imply 
the stronger claim that it is necessary, even if it somehow seems 
that way. Philosophers have debated such points throughout the 
history of philosophy, and continue to do so today. As with most 
disagreements, much of the disagreement is merely verbal- and 
some of it is not. In this article, I will try to distinguish the 
disagreement that is merely verbal from the deeper philosophical 
disagreement. In particular, I hope to show that we should all 
agree that all propositions about the actual world are (now) either 
necessary or impossible if unrestricted bivalence holds, while 
admitting that propositions not (only, or explicitly) about the actual 
world may be contingent, even under the assumption of unrestricted 
bivalence. Put another way, I hope to show that all propositions 
(including those about the future) are either necessary in the actual 
world or impossible in the actual world- again / / we grant 
unrestricted bivalence. I will then argue that possibility in the 
actual world, rather than any other type of possibility, is the modal 
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concept that is required for our powers, abilities (to do otherwise), 
and control. In short, unrestricted bivalence implies that no one is 
able to do otherwise than she does, no one has the power to do 
anything other than she does, and no one is in control of what she 
does. This point is quite significant when combined with so-called 
principle of alternate possibilities, which states that without the 
ability to do otherwise, no one is free or morally responsible for 
her actions.' 
II. Sketching the Argument 
The following is the exact argument I want to defend: 
1) It is true (at to) that x does y at t]. 2(assumption) 
2) It is true (at to) that x does y at t [ in the actual world, (from 1) 
3) It is necessary (at to) that x does y at t[ in the actual world. 
In other words, in/from all (at to) possible worlds, x does y at 
tj in the actual world, (from 2) 
4) X is not able to do otherwise than y at ti • x does not have the 
power at to to not do y at t] (a.k.a. refrain from doing y at t j) ; 
x does not at to have under her control whether or not she does 
y at t ]. (from 3) 
5) X is not free, or morally responsible, in regards to whether or 
not she does y at t ] . (from 4) 
I have given the stronger, more general argument, but to focus 
on my target, let to be now and t( some time in the future. Then 
we are talking about future time facts. Then the argument shows 
that if it is now true that x does y at some time in the future, it is 
now necessary that x does y at that (future) time in the actual 
world. In other words, it is now impossible that x does not do y at 
that (future) time in the actual world! In other words, I am arguing 
that / /we accept unrestricted bivalence (which I do not think we 
should), we get that for everything we do in the future, nothing 
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else was ever possible—in the actual world, that is. I then argue 
that this excludes our control/ability to do otherwise—and hence 
our freedom and moral responsibility. Note that a parallel argument 
shows that if it is previously true that x does not do y at t i , then it 
is at that previous time necessary that x not do y at t] in the actual 
world (i.e. it is at that time impossible that x does y at ti in the 
actual world)- and ultimately that x is not morally responsible for 
not doing y at ti. 
To be a little more specific, let to be the moment of one's 
birth, let t] variously refer to all the different times of one's future 
life, and let y variously refer to different possible actions one might 
take, or life choices one might make, significant and insignificant 
alike. By the argument just sketched (and unrestricted bivalence), 
even then, at the moment of one's birth, it is not possible that one 
act in any other way (in the actual world) than one winds up acting 
throughout one's entire life. If at the moment of ones birth it is 
not possible (in the actual world) that one act other than one 
(supposedly) will throughout one's life, then nowhere later could 
it be possible that one act differently than one does. An opponent 
can reject the very last inference, and it will leave my argument 
untouched- again, just run the argument separately for every 
moment of one's life. In other words, using the assumption, 1), let 
to refer individually to all the different moments at which one 
exists; if the argument is sound, then there is no moment at which 
one can act differently than one has acted, is acting, or will act 
(again, assuming we grant unrestricted bivalence). I proceed to 
argue that one can conclude that there is correspondingly no 
moment where one has control over her actions (or freedom and 
moral responsibility for the said actions). As is emphasized above 
and will be made more explicit, I am not challenging the traditional 
modal logic framework, but rather I am highlighting a specific 
modal notion, which is aptly called possibility in the actual world. 
III. Defending the Argument 
Now let me briefly elaborate upon and defend each of the 
claims/steps in the argument above: 
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Step One: This is the sole hypothesis or premise in question. The 
succeeding steps follow, in the order suggested, culminating with 
the conclusion, 5). 
Step Two: This either follows from, or is equivalent to, 1). At 
least on standard accounts, saying x doesy at tj is tantamount to 
saying x doesy at tj in the actual world. In any case, interesting 
future time facts (or, if my interlocutor insists, the ones I am 
interested in) concern what will happen in the actual world. This 
seems obvious, but some ambiguity lurks. Let me therefore say 
more about what I mean by 'the actual world'. Contrary to David 
Lewis's recommendation, I use 'the actual world' to rigidly 
designate, or uniquely identify, this world.4 I use 'the actual world' 
as a demonstrative. Even if one does not accept the claim that 
there is a truth about which expressions are rigid designators and 
which are not, one nevertheless ought to acknowledge that one 
may use a term as a rigid designator (along the lines Kripke 
explains), if one declares such and is clear and consistent about 
doing so. 5 In so doing, one is merely explaining what one means 
by her language. And what / mean by 'the actual world' is the 
world in which you and I live, not, for example, our "twins" in a 
world extremely similar but not identical to ours. I mean this world, 
our world, with all of its particularities, its uniqueness, and its 
unknown characteristics. For at least most descriptions of the actual 
world, several "possible" worlds will meet this description. By 
'the actual world ' , I do not mean a world that meets some 
description of this world that fails to uniquely identify it. If for 
some reason this is still not clear, try giving the actual world, our 
world, a name or a number- say, world 153. Then substitute 'world 
153' for 'the actual world' in the argument sketched above and 
analyzed below. In any case, as I am using the expression, 'the 
actual world' refers to the same world in/from all possible worlds-
namely ours! 
But what exactly is our, this, or the actual world? By 'the 
actual world', I mean the world as defined by all that is presently 
true about the (this) world. Hence, the actual world at present 
may not include much of its future (i.e. may not include very many 
truths about the future). For example, it may be presently 
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undetermined whether or not I go to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight (i.e. 
it may not (now) be true that I will go to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight 
but also not (now) true that I will not to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight).* 
In other words, nothing about the world right now implies exactly 
when I will go to bed tonight. Thus, when I go to bed tonight is in 
no sense a part of this world (the actual world) at present, but at 
best a part of what this world will be- though 'what this world will 
be ' does not currently refer to anything (in particular) to the extent 
to which the future is undetermined (not implied) by what is 
presently the case. In any case, when I use 'the actual world', I 
mean only this world at present. 
The idea of the future being undetermined should be rejected 
by anyone who affirms unrestricted bivalence, for if bivalence holds 
in an unqualified way, then all future possibilities (currently) either 
will obtain (in the actual world) or will not obtain (in the actual 
world), and correspondingly the entire future of the actual world 
holds, or obtains, now, in this world. I think that this is at least one 
reason why more philosophically standard usage lets a world be 
defined by an entire past, present, and future. Most philosophers 
and philosophical traditions sanction unrestricted bivalence; thus 
the most natural and complete way to define a world is as including 
its future as well as its past and present. However, one may want 
to hold out against unrestricted bivalence, since it ignores an 
important distinction (see section I). One may also want to hold 
out against unrestricted bivalence on the suspicion that it implies 
that we are not ever able to do otherwise, that we are not free, and 
that we are not deeply or morally responsible for any of our actions 
(I am attempting to ground this suspicion in this article). 
Step Three: Just to be clear, I will explain why one cannot validly 
infer that a proposition is necessary (or that its contradictory is 
impossible) purely on the basis of the fact that it is true. Focusing 
again on our actions, we could have, at least in a very general 
sense/modality, done things differently that we did in the past; the 
world could have unfolded differently than it did. Some of us 
might have gone to college at another school. Looking forward, 
we can do any of a number of different things next Saturday, some 
of which we will not actually do. In other words, what we do next 
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Saturday is not necessary but contingent. Alternatively, it is said 
that we do different things on Saturday in different possible worlds 
(or in different possible scenarios). But why do we say such things? 
Two possibilities come to mind. First of all, we say this because if 
our situation/surroundings were different—or we were different 
in terms of our motivations, knowledge, or abilities—our actions 
would correspondingly alter. Secondly, we may say this in the 
belief that we are free from causal determinism and so the future 
of the actual world is causally undetermined; hence, the (actual) 
future could turn out in a number of different ways. Either 
explanation at least seems to support the claim that lots of options 
about our actions today were possible in our past, and lots of options 
are today possible about our future plans and actions. More 
formally, philosophers say that in other possible worlds, we do 
things other than what we actually do (do in the actual world). 
Examples that illustrate this idea include the following: it is true 
that I will play basketball on Wednesday but possible that I will 
not; the Lakers will win the NBA championship again in 2002 but 
it is possible that they will not; though I did decide to buy a kayak, 
it was possible that I did not decide to buy one. I must admit that 
I am suspicious of such claims, particularly the first two (future-
directed) claims, but I hope I have captured above how/why such 
claims are made. 
In any case, the situation is altogether different with the 'in 
the actual world' qualification. Here the question is whether x 
does y at t] in the actual world entails that x does y at t] in the 
actual world is necessary (i.e. that x does not do y at t] in the 
actual world is impossible). To be more exact, is it the case that at 
whatever points in time x doesy att] in the actual world is true, x 
doesy att] in the actual world is necessary, or necessarily true, as 
well? As I have explained, when I (and perhaps the reader as 
well) use 'the actual world', I (we) mean rigidly this world, our 
world, the world in which we all live with its past and present, and 
to the extent it already is fixed, or a part of this world, its future. 
The actual world is, again, not a world identical to this (the actual) 
world in some set of respects/characteristics, but the one and only 
world which is strictly identical to this one. Taking note of this, it 
is rather clear that the inference in question is valid. If it is true 
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that x does y at t] in the actual world, it follows that it is necessary 
that x doesy attjin the actual world. Why? Quite simply because, 
granted the assumption, the (actual) world would contain a 
contradiction if x did not do y at tj in the actual world. Since x 
not doing y at tj in the actual world would produce a contradiction, 
it is impossible! X not doing y at t\ in some other world would 
not produce a contradiction, but x not doing y at t i in the actual 
world obviously would. Sure, one could discharge the assumption 
(and recourse to x doing y at t] in some distinct and incompatible 
world), but that would not prove anything. The question is whether 
or not the premise can be true and the conclusion false at the same 
time. That cannot be. 
This point can be made a bit more formally as well. Consider 
the possible worlds framework: what is possible is what occurs 
(or is true) in at least one possible world, and what is necessary 
occurs in all possible worlds. For it to be necessary that x does y 
att] in the actual world, this proposition would have to be true in/ 
from all possible worlds. Is it true that x does yatt] in the actual 
world in/from other possible worlds? Presumably, in many worlds, 
x does not do y at t i - but there is no world where it is true that x 
does not do yatt] in the actual world. This assumes the singularity 
of reference of 'the actual world', but I have made it clear that this 
is how I am using the language and what is at issue. Consider 
calling the actual world world 153 here again. If it is true that x 
does yatt] in world 153, then it is true that x does y at t] in the 
world 153 in/from all other possible worlds (e.g. worlds 1-152, 
world 154, and so on). 
I think this explains some of our ambivalence about whether 
or not the claim that it is now true that some future event will 
occur implies claims like the following: this event's occurring is 
the only way things can go, it is already fixed that this will happen, 
and the like. In a sense these things do follow: there is 
correspondingly only one way things can go in the actual world. 
In another sense these things do not follow: in other possible 
worlds that are very similar to the actual world, things go 
differently. The latter observation leads many philosophers to claim 
that things therefore could have gone differently. Sometimes, such 
philosophers even claim, paradoxically and dubiously, that things 
POSSIBILITY IN THE ACTUAL WORLD 31 
therefore could have gone differently in the actual world. However, 
we have just seen the deep problems with claiming the latter (while 
using 'the actual world' as a rigid designator). 
Step Four: Until this point, it may have appeared that my argument 
here is merely verbal; it may appear that the argument at hand is 
merely an argument over who owns the expression 'possibility in 
the actual world'. I think the disagreement here is much more 
than a verbal dispute, as is seen first of all by considering whether 
4) follows from 3). In other words, what sense of possibility (or 
"the way things can go ") is the sense that is relevant to our powers, 
abilities, and control- and ultimately to our freedom and 
responsibility? To answer this, we should get clearer on the notion 
of possibility in the actual world, and on other modal notions that 
might instead be relevant to one's powers, abilities, and control. I 
will now survey three different types of modal notions in an attempt 
to address this question. 
Historical Possibility/Possibility in the Actual World 
Possibility in the actual world is a relatively clear notion: we 
have seen that nothing which contradicts what is (now) true in the 
actual world is (now) possible in the actual world, but there is no 
basis for excluding anything else from being possible in the actual 
world. In other words, a proposition is possible in the actual 
world (at t) if and only if it is consistent with all the truths of the 
world (at t)1. Applying this to the case of one's possible future 
actions, we get the following: a proposed future act, or a 
proposition about the future, is possible in the actual world if and 
only if the relevant action (proposition) is consistent with all the 
current truths of the world. What is currently true about the world 
presumably includes the laws (of nature), which allow one to 
connect causes with their effects, as well as truths about the future 
to the extent that there are currently such truths. One might 
alternatively call this notion historical possibility since it is indexed 
to a time, or is based quite literally on what is now (at this point in 
history) true of the actual world. 
Is possibility in the actual world/historical possibility the type 
of possibility required for agent's having powers and abilities to 
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do otherwise? Indeed it is: one's being able to commit a given 
action (in the actual world!) requires that the action be possible in 
the actual world, or historically possible. Since the past and present 
are fixed, no one is able to change the past or the present nor is 
anyone able to do anything that contradicts past and present truths. 
Put another way, no one has the power to do anything that 
contradicts past and present truths. Since control is typically 
construed as requiring a bi-directional ability or power, one can 
add that a proposedfuture action is under one's control only if the 
act and its contradictory are both possible in the actual world 
(i.e. only if both are individually consistent with the complete 
current description of the world, with the set of all currently true 
propositions about the world). 8 
Logical (Ahistorical) Possibility 
One notion of possibility that is very different than possibility 
in the actual world is logical possibility. Let us say that some 
proposition is logically possible if and only if there is a logically 
consistent description of the (a) world in which the proposition is 
true. 9 Logical possibility is obviously a coherent and internally 
consistent notion, and indeed useful in many reflections. Is logical 
possibility the sense of possibility relevant to what we can do, to 
questions of our powers and abilities? I think it is clear that logical 
possibility is far too loose to be the modal notion that is required 
to justify claims of power, ability, and control. 
The following are just a few counterexamples that one might 
propose to challenge the claim that logical possibility is the modal 
notion we are looking for here. It is logically possible that first 
president of the United States was Bozo the clown. It is also 
logically possible that one died yesterday—right now as one lives 
and breathes today! Perhaps at some time in the past there were 
agents who had the powers and abilities to make these things 
happen (or have happened), but surely no one does today. It is 
also logically possible that I run a sub-five minute mile tomorrow, 
even though I assure you that such is inconsistent with my fitness 
level and running abi l i ty—and any track on Ear th! 
Correspondingly, running a sub-five minute mile is not something 
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I am able to do, or something within my power (certainly tomorrow, 
and probably ever). It is clear that at least some past and present 
truths constrain what is within one's powers and abilities, as well 
as what is under one's control. Hence, more than mere logical 
possibility is required for an action to be under our control or within 
our powers and abilities. 
Partial Historical Possibility 
Many philosophers largely accept the claim that the past is 
fixed or unchangeable, but at the same time argue for the 
compatibility of future time facts/unrestricted bivalence and our 
powers and abilities to do otherwise. For these philosophers, 
certain past (and present) true propositions are not fixed, or at 
least are not restrictive of future possibilities. I describe such 
philosophers as holding a partial historical notion of possibility. 
Let us say that a proposition is partially historically possible if 
and only if it is consistent with a certain (proper) subset of the past 
and present truths. What this subset is varies with the particular 
partial historical account. 
William Ockham is a classic example of a philosopher who 
upholds a partial historical notion of possibility.1 0 Ockham and 
his followers hold that propositions purely about the past do restrict 
future possibilities and are (now) all either necessary or impossible. 
For example, on their view 'Bill Clinton was the President of the 
United States in 1998' is now necessary and 'Airplanes started 
mysteriously falling from the sky on January 1, 2000' is now 
impossible. Any proposition inconsistent with a (true) proposition 
purely about the past will not be admitted as possible by an 
Ockhamist. On the other hand, on the Ockhamist view propositions 
in part about the future are in most cases contingent (neither 
necessary nor impossible). For example, 'It is now true that I will 
eat bran flakes tomorrow* is contingent on the Ockhamist view. It 
is thus claimed that at least most propositions in part about the 
future are not restrictive of historical possibilities. This makes 
future time facts compatible with contrary possibilities, and, by 
implication, with contrary powers and abilities (with one's ability 
to do otherwise). 
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However, partial historical possibility stops short of what is 
required for genuine powers, abilities (to do otherwise than one 
does), and control. Why? When one considers what type of 
possibili ty is relevant to one 's powers and abil i t ies , it is 
straightforwardly irrelevant happens in other worlds, as defined 
by a different set of true propositions (or what would happen if 
this world were different than it is). When one wonders about 
what one has the power or ability to do, one is not wondering what 
is consistent with a set of propositions, some of which arefalse, or 
a set of propositions that excludes certain true propositions. The 
number of false propositions is not the issue; a world with a single 
false proposition (i.e. a proposition now false in the actual world) 
is just as irrelevant to one's powers, abilities, and options as are 
worlds with hundreds of false propositions, for the contradicted 
or omitted proposition might be, and in the context likely is, the 
reason the option in question is being claimed as within the agent's 
power or ability. If it is now true that I will not go for a run 
tomorrow (not that it is unlikely that I will run tomorrow, or that 
some wise individual thinks I will not run tomorrow, or that the 
relevant proposition will be true at some later point), it seems to 
straightforwardly follow that, at least for me, in this world, I lack 
the power or ability to run tomorrow. After all, if I actually did 
run tomorrow (if I ran tomorrow in the actual world), the actual 
world would contain a contradiction. Surely the actual world 
cannot contain a contradiction, and perhaps even more surely / do 
not have the power to make it so. One's doing x in a world 
characterized by a set of (true) propositions which is different than 
that of the actual world (at present) simply does not help support 
the claim that it is (now) in one's power to do x (in the actual 
world!), nor does it help justify the claim that one is able to do x 
(in the actual world). It is not that one cannot sensibly talk about 
such worlds or such possibilities; it is just that these worlds tell us 
nothing about our (current, this-world) abilities, our control, and 
our powers. 
Step Five: This follows from 4), and natural definit ions/ 
conceptions of freedom and (moral) responsibility. Most have a 
strong intuition that freedom and moral responsibility require an 
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ability to do otherwise (and the related powers and control), 
although I must acknowledge that many disagree. I embrace the 
commonly held intuition that if an agent has no other choice, no 
other option, and/or no control over the outcome of her decision-
making process or her behavior, she therefore does not act freely 
and bears no moral responsibility for what she does. If an action 
is really unavoidable or such that it could not fail to occur, it is not 
the responsibility of its agent; rather, the act is the responsibility 
of whatever circumstances or powers made it unavoidable, if 
anything at all. As I alluded to above, I do not deny that there are 
some conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility that do not 
require that one be capable of doing otherwise than one does, but 
I suggest that these conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility 
are weak and ultimately unsatisfying. Such conceptions do not 
capture what is interesting and important about us as decision 
makers and agents. It seems to me that accounts that deny that 
freedom and responsibility require an ability to do otherwise are 
too narrowly focused on the question of when it is practical to 
hold an individual responsible, and forget about the question of 
when it is fair or appropriate to hold an individual responsible, i.e. 
the question of when an individual deserves to be praised or blamed 
for her actions." 
IV. An Example 
The following example helps illustrate the crucial argument, 
from 3) to 4) as outlined above. Consider a young college student 
wondering if he can solve all the proofs in his abstract algebra 
assignment before the next class, when the assignment is due. He 
wonders if it is in his power (within his reach) to solve them all, if 
it is under his control whether or not he solve them all, etc. What, 
exactly, would support the claim that he has such in his power— 
or that he is able to do so? What would not support the student's 
being able to complete all the proofs and the like is that his 
completing all of them is consistent with some partially false or 
incomplete (at the time of his inquiry) set of truths. In other words, 
that it is possible in a logical/ahistorical, or only partially 
historical, sense of possibility that he complete them all does not 
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justify the relevant claims of powers and abilities here. For 
example, if he had begun the proofs earlier (when he hasn't), or if 
he were a little more creative (than he is at the time), or if the 
proofs were a little easier (than they are), or if he were a little 
more diligent (than he is at the time), or if it were not true that he 
will fail to complete them all (though it is true), then, let's say, he 
would, or could, have completed all the proofs. Or say that if one 
ignores the fact that he has the exact level of diligence and creativity 
he does, or the fact that it is now (already) true that he will not 
complete all the proofs, then there is a corresponding complete 
and comprehensive story (world) in which he completes all the 
proofs. Do any of these observations support the claim that it is in 
his power, or under his control, that he completes all the proofs? I 
think it is clear that these observations do not help establish the 
said abilities and powers. 
Rather, for him to have the ability to complete all the proofs, 
his doing so must be consistent with all the present and past truths 
of the actual world (his world), at the time of inquiry concerning 
possibility- including his creative and intellectual talents, his 
diligence, the time he began working, the particularities of his 
surroundings, and future time facts (that are then true). For him to 
have the ability to complete all the proofs, it must be possible for 
him, here, in this world to complete them all; i.e. his completing 
all the proofs must be possible in the actual world. Such 
consistency (with the actual world at the relevant time) is necessary 
for the student to have the said powers, or to have the said 
possibilities within his reach or under his control. We may put 
this a bit more technically as follows: completing all the proofs is 
under the student's control at t only if both completing all the 
proofs and not completing all the proofs are (individually) 
consistent with all that is true about the actual world at t (i.e. his 
completing all the proofs and his not completing all the proofs are 
both possible in the actual world at t). 
V. Conclusion 
In sum, I contend that there is overwhelming reason to say 
that possibility in either an ahistorical/logical or a partial historical 
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sense is not the sense of possibility that is required for one to be 
able to do otherwise, and to have power and control over her 
actions. Partial historical notions (in the radical case ahistorical 
notions) of possibility recognize only part of presently true 
propositions as restrictive of future possibilities, thus ignoring many 
of the very truths that clearly exclude the possibility of our acting 
in various ways- in the actual world, of course. The sense of 
possibility required for one's powers, abilities, and control over 
her actions is more restrictive than even partial historical 
possibility; the restriction that must be made is consistency with 
all that is currently true, including the presently true laws, which 
connect propositions with one another, or causes with their effects.' 
I have therefore characterized the modal concept that is 
required for our abilities, powers, and control- and ultimately our 
freedom and responsibility- as being consistent with all present 
truths and called it possibility in the actual world. We have good 
reason to uphold the inference from the necessity in the actual 
world of an action (or the impossibility in the actual world of its 
contradictory) to the relevant agent's inability to do otherwise (the 
inference from 3) to 4) in the argument sketched at the outset of 
this article), for we have shown that any partial historical modal 
notion fails, that anything short of (weaker than) possibility in the 
actual world is not restrictive enough to be the modal concept 
required for one's powers, abilities, and control. Hence, the only 
recourse for the philosopher who wants to uphold the compatibility 
of unrestricted bivalence and freedom/responsibility is to insist 
that freedom and responsibility do not require the ability or power 
to do otherwise, i.e. to object to the inference from 4) to 5) in the 
argument I have sketched. However, many philosophers have made 
a strong case that this inference is in fact legitimate. 
Notes 
' I argued for the principle of alternate possibilities and addressed 
Harry Frankfurt's alleged counterexamples to the principle in another 
article. 
2 One who believes that propositions never become true or false as 
time goes by will find my parenthetical qualifications a bit odd, or, better, 
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unnecessary stipulations. However, it is unfair to object to the argument 
to come simply because its locutions are unnecessarily specific. 
Furthermore, I ask the interlocutor who is suspicious in this way to simply 
ignore the at to qualification. The argument is still sound. 
3 Or, one could put it in these terms: it is now necessary in the 
actual world that x does y at tjand impossible in the actual world that x 
does not do y a t t i . 
4 See Lewis, D. 1986. On The Plurality of Worlds. Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers, especially pp. 92-96. 
5 See Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
6 Granted, it is true that I will go to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight or it is 
not true that I will go to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight even in the scenario I 
am suggesting—it is not true that / will go to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight in 
this scenario. However, it is not true that I will not go to bed at 11:04 
p.m. tonight either. Bear in mind that the latter is not to say that I will go 
to bed at 11:04 p.m. tonight, so long as we appreciate the distinction 
between internal and external negation. Again, see section I. 
7 1 take it that if a proposition is true at some time t, then it is true 
that is (was) true then at all later times. In other words, if p is true at 11, 
then p is (was) true at tj is true at all times t, where t is after t\. For 
example, if it true that many persons are scared ofY2K in 1999, then in 
all years later than 1999, it is true that many persons are (were, we say) 
scared of Y2K in 1999. So long as the time index is already (implicitly or 
explicitly) in p, we can simply infer from p's being true (at ti) that p is 
true at all later times t. A case of an explicit time index would be the 
proposition, Mark McGuire broke the home run record in 1998. There 
are also many cases where the time index of a proposition is merely implicit 
(e.g. whenever one speaks in the present tense without noting the relevant 
present time). For example, the proposition George W. Bush is the 
President of the United States is now true but will not (as such) be true in 
3001. However, if one takes the implicit time index into account, the 
proposition just mentioned is more exactly captured as George W. Bush 
is the President of the United States in 2001, and that proposition is true 
at all times in the future. Hence, in saying that what is appropriately 
deemed possible is what is consistent with all present truths, one is saying 
that what is appropriately deemed possible is what is consistent with all 
present and past truths- since all that was true in the past, when 
appropriately indexed to the past, is true in the present. 
8 I use 'only i f here rather than the biconditional since I hold that 
possibility in the actual world is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for an act which an agent is in control of, has in her power, etc. Roughly 
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speaking, the farther necessary condition is that a relevant undetermined 
event/proposition directly involves the agent rather than something outside 
of her. For freedom and moral responsibility, as opposed to (mere) powers 
and abilities, I believe some additional conditions are required as well. 
These additional conditions include, importantly, a certain understanding 
of the different options and a genuine effort to make the right choice. 
9 Somewhat different notions may be carved out by additional 
constraints besides logical consistency. For example, one may insist that 
the laws of nature and/or certain metaphysical truths be the same in all 
"possible" worlds as they are in the actual world. 
1 0 See, for example, Ockham, William. 1983. Predestination, God's 
Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. M. M cCord Adams and 
N. Kretzmann. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers. Luis de Molina 
offers an interesting variant on the partial historical approach to possibility 
(and powers and abilities), claiming that non-causal past and present 
truths do not restrict agents' possibilities, powers, and abilities. Non-
causal truths include the types of future time facts just mentioned. 
Molina's account is implausible for essentially the same reasons I will 
cover with respect to Ockham. See De Molina, Luis. 1988. On Divine 
Foreknowledge, trans. A.J. Freddoso. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
*1 Harry Frankfurt has offered a famous objection to the inference 
from 4) to 5), which I have addressed in a separate article. 
1 2 The laws must be presently true for them to restrict possibilities, 
or freedom and control. If the laws are true only once the world's history 
is complete, they do not plausibly restrain our actions or threaten our 
(current) powers and abilities. As van Inwagen argues, such "laws" are 
not really laws at all. See Van Inwagen, P. 1982. The Incompatibility of 
Free Will and Determinism. In Free Will, ed. G. Watson, 46-58. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
